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The Territorial Constitution and the Brexit Process 
Stephen Tierney* 
Abstract: This article assesses the United Kingdom’s rapidly evolving territorial constitution 
through the register of federal theory. While not arguing that the UK is federal or ought to be 
described as federal, the article contends that federalism is a useful prism through to assess 
how well the UK’s constitution accommodates autonomy on the one hand and the efficacy of 
union, which is the essential complement of pluralism, on the other. It then proceeds to assess 
the Brexit process in light of existing imbalances in the UK’s territorial arrangements. The way 
in which Parliament has paved the way for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU is 
widely considered to be deeply unpropitious for devolution. However, upon further analysis of 
the legal changes and internal political commitments that have been designed to facilitate 
Brexit, it would appear that a more balanced set of constitutional arrangements may be 
emerging which could in fact bolster and further embed the United Kingdom’s territorial 
constitutional commitments. 
Key words: Brexit, devolution, federalism, territorial constitution 
1. Introduction 
The referendum vote in 2016 to leave the European Union came at a time of rapid 
transformation in the United Kingdom’s territorial constitution. Last year marked the 20th 
anniversary of the legislation through which Parliament created bespoke and complex systems 
of self-government for each of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the last of these of course 
the culmination of a fraught peace process. This was a dramatic and in some ways 
overwhelming period of constitutional change. In addition to establishing devolution, 
Parliament also passed the Human Rights Act 1998, the House of Lords Act 1999, and the 
Freedom of Information Act 2000, while steps began to restructure and rename the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords. But even in relation only to the territorial constitution, the 
period was one of great complexity. A number of reform processes took place concurrently, 
each with different origins and each resulting in highly singular models of territorial 
government. Indeed, the word ‘asymmetry’1 entered our constitutional lexicon as a key 
descriptor of Britain’s new territorial arrangements.  
 Were it not for the Brexit process which now so preoccupies both our institutions of 
government and those who comment upon them, the law and politics review journals and blogs 
would probably be dominated by reflections upon this anniversary and by further comment 
throughout this year to mark the anniversaries of the creation of the legislative assemblies and 
parliaments in Belfast, Cardiff and Edinburgh. But of course the Brexit vote and the political 
manoeuvrings that it has produced have over-shadowed other areas of the British constitution 
for which it promises to have profound implications.   
 In this article we will first take stock of this period of extraordinary and ongoing 
constitutional change brought about by devolution, arguing that for all its benefits in terms of 
granting autonomy to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the trajectory of devolution and 
the pace of transformation since then are together potentially destabilising to the union. 
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1 CMG Himsworth, ‘Devolution and its Jurisdictional Asymmetries’ (2007) 70 MLR 31. 
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Secondly, we will observe that despite wide recognition of this problem, federalism has very 
rarely been taken seriously as a solution to the lop-sidedness produced by devolution which 
leaves England with no form of specific national self-government. Part of the reason for this is 
that federalism itself generally fails to be addressed as a potentially capacious constitutional 
idea but is instead tied to particular institutional understandings of what a federal system must 
look like. We will argue that when its underlying purpose is reconsidered from the perspective 
of constitutional theory, the institutional adaptability of federalism in fact makes it of wider 
relevance to a range of territorial arrangements, as these vary from state to state. While not 
arguing that the UK is federal or ought to be described as federal, our claim is that federalism 
offers a framework for constitutional government that is more commodious, and therefore 
potentially responsive to the territorial realities of each polity, than is often assumed; and that 
its core idea is a useful mirror with which to reflect on the health of the UK’s constitutional 
arrangements. Thirdly, we then discuss how, even with this broader conception of federalism, 
the UK’s territorial constitution requires to develop a much healthier balance between the 
competing but also complementary goals of pluralism and union.  
 In the final part of the article we turn to the Brexit process wherein we can see the 
consequence of this imbalance in full relief. Such has been the drama of the past three years 
that it is of course impossible to make predictions about where relations between the UK and 
EU will culminate. Therefore, the reflections offered here will instead draw upon the main 
steps in the process to date which, regardless of what happens next, have already cast light on 
the state of the territorial constitution. In some ways this period seems to be deeply unpropitious 
for devolution. We will discuss why that is the case, noting how intergovernmental tensions 
over the withdrawal process have exposed deeper strains within the territorial constitution 
itself. But we will also argue that, perhaps paradoxically, it is in thinking about and preparing 
for Brexit, and in the interaction of Brexit legislation and recent devolution statutes, that we 
may be witnessing the emergence of the more balanced set of constitutional arrangements that 
is in fact needed if the UK’s territorial constitution is to continue to flourish. 
 
2. Twenty Years of Devolution 
Given the level of asymmetry and complexity that characterise the three very different models 
of government created two decades ago, the arrangements that were put in place are to some 
extent still finding their feet. A common description of the three statutes passed in 1998 – the 
Scotland Act, Northern Ireland Act and Government of Wales Act - is ‘devolution settlements’, 
but the territorial constitution is far from ‘settled’.2 Indeed, the Northern Ireland Act was 
specifically designed to avoid the idea of constitutional finality, section 1 leaving open to Irish 
nationalists the prospect of a referendum on reunification of Ireland.3 The notion of finality is 
equally misplaced in relation to the other two devolved systems, a fact evident from the way 
in which the competences devolved to both Scotland and Wales, and indeed the entire structure 
of devolved government for Wales, have been the subject of radical change, particularly in the 
past decade, with Scotland Acts passed in 2012 and 2016 and three statutes for Wales between 
                                                 
2 N Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ [2014] Public Law 529. 
3 Northern Ireland Act 1998, section 1 and schedule 1. It should also be noted that, of the three sets of devolved 
arrangements for the UK, those in Northern Ireland have travelled along a particularly rocky road and remain 
suspended since January 2017. 
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2006 and 2017,4 not to mention the current deliberations of the Commission on Justice in 
Wales, which may well propose a new legal jurisdiction for Wales.5  
 Following on from the Scotland Act 2012, and without the tax-varying powers which 
it contained having even taken effect, we had the drama of the independence referendum in 
2014 and, hot on its tail, the Scotland Act 2016, making Scotland one of the most autonomous 
sub-state territories in Europe. One consequence of asymmetry in the UK’s devolution 
arrangements has been some degree of curtain-twitching. Welsh (and indeed English) 
nationalists have, since 1998, looked northwards with envy at the degree of autonomy enjoyed 
by the Scottish Parliament. The upshot has been a process of seemingly endless devolution of 
powers to Wales, with Parliament barely pausing for breath from one inquiry to another, 
resulting in a complex legislative mosaic, culminating in the Wales Act 2017. This last piece 
of legislation indeed represents a gear shift towards a more fully autonomous model in line 
with the Scotland Acts.6   
 Just as there has been no settlement, nor is there any obvious finishing post for 
devolution so long as it remains largely demand-led. Initiatives for further devolution have 
tended to come from the sub-state territories themselves and have been acceded to by the 
centre, either due to a lack of strong opposition (in relation to Wales), or in order to deal with 
the perceived danger of strengthening nationalism (the impetus behind the Scotland Acts of 
2012 and 2016). The consequence has been a rapidly evolving process of further autonomy for 
the devolved territories with no meaningful consideration of the impact of these changes upon 
the UK as a state.7 It is in this context of rapid change that the House of Lords Constitution 
Committee has undertaken a number of inquiries which have attempted to track the impact of 
more and more devolution legislation.8 What is notable is that parliamentary scrutiny of major 
devolution proposals has tended to take place ex post facto; either after the passage of important 
legislation, or at least after the giving of political commitments which are very difficult to roll 
back at the point Parliament becomes involved. Furthermore, since Parliament is expected to 
respond piece by piece to disjointed proposals, it is very challenging to situate these in the 
broader context of the union, or of the deep dissatisfaction within England with processes 
which take little if any account for the fact that England was not granted devolution at all,9 
apart from some innovations in mayoral and local government.10  
                                                 
4 Government of Wales Acts 2006 and 2014; Wales Act 2017.  
5 See <https://beta.gov.wales/commission-justice-wales> accessed 1 July 2019. 
6 The 2017 Act constitutes no less than a transformation of Welsh devolution, moving it from a conferred matters 
model to a reserved matters model, the latter analogous to Scottish devolution which is widely seen as a very 
strong model of self-rule. 
7 For an insightful set of reflections on the state of the union see R Rawlings, ‘Riders on the Storm: Wales, the 
Union, and Territorial Constitutional Crisis’ (2015) 42 Journal of Law and Society 471. 
8 House of Lords Constitution Committee, Proposals for the Devolution of Further Powers to Scotland (HL 2014–
15, 145) (hereafter ‘Proposals for the Devolution of Further Powers to Scotland Report’); House of Lords 
Constitution Committee, Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom (HL 2014–15, 146) (hereafter 
‘Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom Report’); House of Lords Constitution Committee, Scotland 
Bill (HL 2015–16, 59) (hereafter ‘Scotland Bill Report’); and House of Lords Constitution Committee, ‘The Union 
and devolution’, (HL 2015-16, 149) (hereafter The Union and devolution’ report). 
9 S Tierney, ‘Brexit and the English question’ in F Fabbrini (ed), The Law and Politics of Brexit (OUP 2017) 95-
114. 
10 Greater London Authority Act 1999; Cities and Local Government Devolution Act 2016. 
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 In 2014 the Constitution Committee reported on proposals for further powers for the 
Scottish Parliament,11 which were initially formulated (effectively on the back of an envelope) 
a few days before the independence referendum,12 and which, through the Smith Commission13 
rapidly took on pre-legislative form. The Committee expressed concern that the UK 
Government had simply transformed the Smith Commission proposals into draft legislation 
without addressing their implications for the United Kingdom as a whole.14 The Committee’s 
conclusion was that the Government must ‘devise and articulate a coherent vision for the shape 
and structure of the United Kingdom, without which there cannot be constitutional stability.’15 
Over four years later it is very hard to detect any such coherent vision in any of the proposals 
to extend devolution which were advanced either before or since 2014, although any such 
endeavour has to a large extent been overtaken by the more pressing issue of Brexit.  
 The 2014 experience prompted a full inquiry by the Committee, resulting in a more 
comprehensive report ‘The Union and devolution’, published in May 2015. Again the 
Committee set out its concerns, this time in greater detail and with an even stronger expression, 
calling for steps to ‘safeguard the integrity of the Union.’16 And in this level of concern the 
Committee is not alone. Other parliamentary committees have made similar points about the 
union,17 as have significant reports by both the Institute for Government18 and the Bingham 
Centre for the Rule of Law.19  
 The United Kingdom’s ‘political constitution’ is one which has been able to bring about 
constitutional change rapidly and flexibly. In many ways this has been a strength, allowing it 
                                                 
11 ‘Proposals for the Devolution of Further Powers to Scotland Report’ (n 8). 
12 David Cameron, Gordon Brown and Nick Clegg, ‘The Vow’, 16 September 2014. 
13 ‘Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish Parliament’ (27 November 
2014) <https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20151202171029/http://www.smith-commission.scot/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-1.pdf> accessed 1 July 2019. 
14 ‘Proposals for the Devolution of Further Powers to Scotland Report’ (n 8) para 13.  
15 ‘Proposals for the Devolution of Further Powers to Scotland Report’ (n 8) para 24. In its subsequent report on 
intergovernmental relations, the Committee also stated: ‘The UK’s devolution settlements are of the highest 
constitutional significance. We are deeply concerned by the lack of central co-ordination and oversight of the 
devolution settlements and of the minimal consideration given to the effect of devolution in one area of the UK 
on other areas, and on the Union as a whole.’ ‘Inter-governmental relations in the United Kingdom Report’ (n 8) 
para 133. 
16 It asserted: ‘Proper consideration of the cumulative impact of devolution on the integrity of the Union itself has 
been lacking… power has been devolved without any counter-balancing steps to protect the Union… While the 
constitution should reflect the wishes and interests of the nations and regions, that must not be at the expense of 
the stability, coherence and viability of the Union as a whole. Should any proposals for further devolution arise 
in the future, they should be considered within an appropriate framework of constitutional principles that 
safeguard the integrity of the Union.’ ‘The Union and Devolution Report’ (n 8) Summary. 
17 E.g. House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, The Future of the 
Union, part one: English Votes for English laws (HC 2015–16, 523) para 13. 
18 Institute for Government, ‘Four-nation Brexit: How the UK and devolved governments should work together 
on leaving the EU’ (Institute for Government Briefing Paper, October 2016) 
<https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/summary-devolution-after-brexit> accessed 1 July 2019. 
19 ‘We can no longer allow the basic structure of the country to evolve in a haphazard fashion, through deals 
behind closed doors and unenforceable promises blown by the prevailing political wind in one part of the country 
or another.’ Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, ‘A Constitutional Crossroads: Ways Forward For the United 
Kingdom’ (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 15 May 2015) 
<https://www.biicl.org/documents/595_a_constitutional_crossroads.pdf?showdocument=1> accessed 1 July 
2019, 19. See also S Tierney, ‘Can the Union Survive the Election?’ (UK Const L Blog, 9th May 2015) (available 
at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org). 
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to respond with agility to constitutional pressures. In another sense though it can fall victim to 
the vicissitudes of political demands, giving these constitutional effect too rapidly without 
thought to the impact of fast and significant changes in one area upon the broader constitutional 
landscape. Devolution is a classic case in point. By broad consensus, as we take stock on the 
20th anniversary of devolution, we see an ad hoc approach to territorial government, one that 
has largely acquiesced in accommodating ambitious and highly specific autonomy demands 
from Scotland and Wales, but which in doing so has come to be characterised by a lack of 
reflection about the impact of these changes upon the coherence of the union or of the purposes 
or principles which underpin it.  
 
3. The United Kingdom and the Federal Idea 
The neglect of the UK as a union is clear, as is the disregard for English identity, evident in the 
fact that England has been given no form of national devolved government at all.20 In this 
context it is perhaps surprising that federalism has rarely featured among constitutional 
prescriptions for the UK. Dicey famously said that in a federal system people ‘must desire 
union, and must not desire unity.’21 On the face of it, this largely sums up the approach taken 
by the Constitution Committee. Dicey’s phrase seems to capture the fact that while the UK 
requires an underlying commitment to, and focus upon, what the union needs to thrive, this is 
entirely compatible with devolution itself. Union does not mean centralisation; territorial 
autonomy can be fostered within a coherent state project. 
 But despite some attention being accorded to it at the turn of the 20th century,22 it is of 
course the case that federalism has rarely been a point of reference either in attempts to describe 
the nature of the British union, or in reflections about how it ought to evolve constitutionally.23 
Indeed, some argue that there is an in-built hostility towards federalism within the British 
political psyche.24 David Marquand in fact has described the British aversion to federalism as 
‘neurotic’, concluding that ‘misconceptions and myths blind British political elites to its 
potential benefits’.25  
 Despite Dicey’s pithy expression concerning union and unity, he is in fact part of the 
reason for this neurosis, although only as a contributor to a wider disciplinary tradition that has 
served to constrain the federal idea within narrow institutional confines. The late Michael 
                                                 
20 In fact, we can talk about ‘double asymmetry’ in devolution. Not only are there stark differences in the powers 
devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland but of course England, the largest nation in the Union, was left 
out of the devolution project. S Tierney, ‘Federalism in a Unitary State: A Paradox too Far?’ (2009) Regional and 
Federal Studies 237. 
21 AV Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan 1915) 75. 
22 See A Jackson, ‘The Failure of British and Irish Federalism, circa 1800–1950’ in R Schütze and S Tierney 
(eds), The United Kingdom and the Federal Idea (Hart 2018) 29-47. 
23 For a recent revival of interest see D Melding, The Reformed Union: The UK as a Federation (Institute of 
Welsh Affairs 2013); D Torrance, Britain Rebooted: Scotland in a Federal Union (Luath Press 2014); and Schütze 
and Tierney (n 22). 
24 M Burgess, The British Tradition of Federalism (Leicester University Press 1985). See also, A Gamble, ‘The 
Constitutional Revolution in the United Kingdom’ (2006) 36 Publius 19; and M Flinders, ‘Constitutional Anomie’ 
(2010) 44 Government and Opposition 383. 
25 D Marquand, ‘Federalism and the British: Anatomy of a Neurosis’ (2006) 77 Political Quarterly 175. 
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Burgess was scathing of what he took to be Dicey’s misreading of federalism. For Burgess, 
Dicey  
‘established a narrow legalistic conception of federalism that was handed down from 
one generation to the next in supine fashion … In practical terms it effectively excluded 
an important option for British constitutional reform up until quite recently and it 
continues to hinder clarity of thought about British national interests… It is hardly 
surprising therefore that misunderstanding and confusion – not to mention barely 
concealed hostility – about federalism produced the phobia that has been a 
characteristic hallmark of British political culture.’26 
 Although Dicey has been accused of distorting our understanding of the fundamental 
nature of the constitution,27 in relation specifically to federalism Burgess tends to flatter, and 
in so doing deflect, in the very act of criticism. In fact, Dicey was not particularly interested in 
federalism as a subject of intellectual study. It was just one possible solution to the crisis in the 
Anglo-Irish union which so preoccupied him, and in the end he rejected it as a slippery slope 
to Irish disunion.28 Insofar as he attempted to define federalism, Dicey was no innovator, 
adopting certain tropes within an already burgeoning literature, and, no surprise, helping to 
consolidate, as Burgess suggests, a narrow formalism in the ontology of federalism as he did 
in relation to a number of constitutional concepts.  
 But Dicey’s approach merely affirms a much broader and inter-temporal tradition. In a 
literature dominated by political science and doctrinal constitutional law, attempts to define 
federalism tend to derive from description, drawn out from observing particular sets of 
institutional arrangements - which have been called ‘federal’ - over the past two hundred and 
fifty years, with a particularly strong influence being exerted by the American model. What we 
find in the literature is either a generic institutionalism, as in Kenneth Wheare’s two levels of 
independent government,29 or a very elaborate and detailed institutional plan of what a federal 
political system must look like, such as that set out by Ronald Watts, with specifics regarding 
second chambers and full judicial review.30 The result either way has been a didactic and binary 
approach to federalism that focuses exclusively upon its institutional manifestation: if a system 
reflects the model which the author has it mind it is federal, if it does not, it is not. And for so 
many commentators the UK falls on the wrong side of the line. However, this approach does 
not take us far; with description masquerading as definition, the attempt to define federalism 
is a largely circular process and depends entirely upon where one draws the institutional line.  
 Another approach within federal scholarship is no more helpful, focusing as it does on 
the merits or demerits of federalism. Those who write on federalism, and leaving aside the few 
                                                 
26 M Burgess, Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice (Routledge 2006) 21. 
27 M Loughlin and S Tierney, ‘The Shibboleth of Sovereignty’ (2018) MLR 989.  
28 See J Kendle, Ireland and the Federal solution: the Debate over the United Kingdom Constitution, 1870–1921 
(McGill-Queen’s University Press 1989 ) 55.  
29 ‘The test which I apply for federal government is simply this: Does a system of government embody 
predominantly a division of powers between general and regional authorities, each of which, in its own sphere, 
is co-ordinate with the others and independent of them?’ K Wheare, Federal Government (4th edn, OUP 1964) 
62. 
30 RL Watts, ‘Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations’ (1998) 1 Annual Review of Political 
Science 117; R Watts, Comparing Federal Systems (2nd edn, Queen’s University Press 1999).  
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sceptics like Dicey or Carl Schmitt,31 are often also be passionate crusaders. Unlike the narrow 
formalists, the most fervent do not focus so much upon institutional description. Such is their 
enthusiasm that they tend to gloss over the a priori issue of defining the subject, preferring to 
extol its virtues; their accounts, as Alvin Jackson puts it, owing more to earnest evangelism 
than rigorous theology.32 
 It is important to avoid both of these approaches, and instead to define and analyse 
federalism firmly within constitutional theory. Such an approach seeks to draw out the specific 
constitutional purposes of federalism as a distinct order of rule for the modern state. 
Constitutionalism is an instrumental device with one generic, comprehensive purpose: the 
management of political power within a polity. To give effect to this purpose a constitution 
creates a set of rules and a body of institutions to operate these rules; in doing so it transforms 
political power into authority, thereby endowing that power with lawful legitimacy. This is the 
way in which the underpinning rationale of all modern constitutions manifests itself in 
normative practice.33 Federalism is a discrete genus of modern constitutionalism. As part of 
the modern constitutional project it shares the common purpose of modern constitutionalism: 
to transform political power into authority. But as a distinct type of modern constitution it does 
this in pursuit of specific constitutional ends: federalism as a particular project of modern 
constitutional rule manages political power for a particular purpose: what is that purpose?  
 The author is engaged in a wider project that seeks to define federal constitutionalism 
as a specific order of rule for the modern state. There is not space here to explain this project 
in detail, but it contends that the specific constitutional (as opposed to political) purpose of 
federalism is the accommodation of territorial pluralism through the constitutional recognition 
and reconciliation of different levels of government within a state. A key point in an approach 
grounded in constitutional theory is that the constitution, in pursuit of its core constitutional 
purpose, cannot be generated through an abstract model but must respond to the specific 
societal conditions it is designed to serve. Any federal constitution must accommodate 
territorial pluralism as it manifests itself within the state in question. It is in this way that the 
federal idea can be useful in addressing the UK’s highly particular form of territorial pluralism, 
even if the term ‘federal’ is not itself used by the constitution’s key actors. The very concept, 
given its core constitutional purpose, can nonetheless serve as a benchmark for how the 
constitution adapts in its own particular way to accommodate the specific form of territorial 
pluralism that characterises our union state (or state of unions).34  
 What flows from federalism’s core purpose, regardless of its institutional 
manifestation, is that the very idea of federalism requires a balance between pluralism 
facilitated through autonomy on the one hand and a concern for the coherence of the state 
project itself, encapsulated in the idea of union, on the other. While the former is achieved 
through what Daniel Elazar called self-rule,35 what we cast more tightly as ‘autonomous 
                                                 
31 C Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (trans Jeffrey Seitzer, Duke University Press 2008) 390. Schmitt concluded 
that a meaningful federal system was, in the end, incompatible with that of the modern state. 
32 Jackson, ‘The Failure of British and Irish Federalism’ (n 22) 30. 
33 M Loughlin, The Foundations of Public Law (OOUP 2010). 
34 The elegant expression offered by James Mitchell: J Mitchell, ‘The Westminster Model and the State of Unions’ 
(2010) 63 Parliamentary Affairs 85. 
35 DJ Elazar, Exploring Federalism (University of Alabama Press 1987). 
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government’; the commitment to the union can only be achieved through shared rule, or what, 
in recognition of the complex matrix of federal rule, we will call ‘associative government’.  
 It is necessary to focus upon the latter dimension as much as the former, and, crucially, 
to understand them as collaborators rather than antagonists. The union dimension highlights 
how the pluralism or autonomy element of federalism should not descend into ‘two 
solitudes’36: the autonomy of the state’s territories on the one hand and the autonomy of the 
central institutions of rule on the other. The notion of union in fact involves the integration of 
those who enjoy autonomy in the central government of the state. Associative government 
therefore is not a constraint on autonomy, but rather a form of co-ownership in the constitution 
and in the government of the state as a whole. It also has the advantage of preventing the state 
itself from coming to be seen as an irrelevance within its autonomous parts. 
 To bring these points together, it is not necessary to struggle to compartmentalise the 
UK within an either/or box when it comes to federalism, or to launch into a passionate 
promotion of federalism as a moral good. Instead federalism as an idea is a useful benchmark 
for the insight it offers on how to help stabilise states characterised by deep territorial pluralism: 
balancing the two dimensions of this pluralism in an integrated way by demonstrating that a 
key dimension of autonomy for sub-state territories is associating in the government of the 
central state, while the health of the state project as a whole depends upon an understanding 
that the very purpose of federalism, as a form of constitutional rule, is the accommodation of 
territorial pluralism, and therefore that autonomy for its constituent territories is a logical 
extension of this underpinning purpose. 
 There is no doubt that the UK has gone a long way in terms of constitutional recognition 
of territorial autonomy. We see this not only in the devolution of extensive competences but 
also in the institutional scaffolding provided by sections 1 of the Scotland Act 2016 and Wales 
Act 2017 respectively. These affirm the permanence of the devolved institutions which are not 
to be abolished except following a referendum in the territory in question.37 There is of course 
an argument that these provisions could be changed by Parliament, similar to that put forward 
by A B Keith in relation to an analogous self-denying ordnance in the Statute of Westminster,38 
but as constitutional theorists we do the discipline no favours if we attempt to amputate our 
subject from its intimate relationship with political reality. It is hard to see how the United 
Kingdom as the state we know today would survive unilateral efforts by the UK Parliament to 
abolish Scottish devolution.39  
 With self-rule constitutionally protected, at least for those parts of the Union which 
enjoy it, the main deficit from the perspective of what we might call the ‘federal balance’ is 
therefore the associative government dimension: the meaningful assimilation of the 
                                                 
36 H MacLennan, Two Solitudes (MacMillan 1978). 
37 Scotland Act 2017, s 1, inserting new s.63A into the Scotland Act 1998 and Wales Act 2017 s 1, inserting new 
Part A1 into the Government of Wales Act 2006. 
38 Statute of Westminster 1931, s 4. Keith argued: ‘Under the statute no attempt is made to renounce the 
legislative supremacy of the United Kingdom Parliament…’, AB Keith, The Governments of the British Empire 
(Macmillan 1936) 34-35. 
39 See Bingham Centre, ‘A Constitutional Crossroads’ (n 19) 13. At a deeper level it can be argued that 
devolution has now tempered the very meaning of constitutional sovereignty in the United Kingdom: Loughlin 
and Tierney, ‘The Shibboleth of Sovereignty’ (n 27) 1015-16. 
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territorialisation of the constitution within the institutions, principles and modus operandi of 
the central state. This leads us to the Brexit process. 
 
4. Brexit and Devolution 
At the time this article is submitted (August 2019), it is impossible to tell where Brexit is going 
in terms of both an agreed withdrawal agreement and any future relationship agreement 
between the UK and the EU. Therefore, our focus is not upon what might happen in the future 
but simply what the planning process for Brexit since 2016 already demonstrates about the 
territorial constitution.  
 At first glance, the prospects for a rebalancing of the state and the achievement of a 
healthier relationship between the autonomy and associative dimensions of territorial 
government do not look good, particularly as we reflect on developments over the past two 
years. But we will argue that, upon closer scrutiny, the picture is more mixed than it may at 
first appear, and that the political battles that have been fought over Brexit legislation, when 
set against the parallel constitutional changes brought about by the Scotland Act 2016 and 
Wales Act 2017, may well be leading to a more complex, consensual and possibly formalised 
dimension of associative government than would otherwise be the case. 
A. Devolution Denied? 
Let us begin however with the strong counter-argument which, to many, is more plausible: that 
the Brexit process has exposed the notion of a federal balance in the UK constitution to be a 
sham. There is merit in this claim for two main reasons. The first is that the devolved 
institutions have no veto power in relation to major constitutional change. The second is that 
they have no enforceable power of consent in relation to constitutionally significant legislation 
that flows from these processes of fundamental transformation; a fact exposed by both judicial 
pronouncement and parliamentary practice.  
 The first of these realities was demonstrated by the referendum of 2016 itself. When 
the national UK majority for Leave is broken down, there were of course majorities for Remain 
in Northern Ireland and Scotland.40 The First Minister of Scotland put forward the view that 
such a major constitutional change should require the endorsement of the populations of each 
of the four territories of the UK.41 This was given short shrift by the UK Government and didn’t 
stimulate much political attention outside of Scotland. But from a federal perspective, 
constitutional amendment is one key area in which the strength of associative government 
manifests itself. In many federal systems important changes to the federal constitution can only 
be brought about by cross-territorial agreement. To take the most pertinent example, Australia, 
which uses referendums to amend its constitution, constitutional change in fact requires, in 
                                                 
40 The referendum question was: ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave 
the European Union?’ Across the UK 52% voted Leave, but within Northern Ireland and Scotland only 44% and 
38%, respectively, did so. 
41 ‘SNP's Sturgeon says UK withdrawal from EU “must have” four nation backing’ BBC News, 29 October 2014 
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-29805045> accessed 1 July 2019. 
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addition to parliamentary support, not only a flat national majority for the proposal to pass, but 
also majorities within four of its six territories in such a referendum.42 
 There has also been strong devolved objection to both the principle and the practice of 
the passage of significant legislation, where that legislation has important consequences for 
devolved competence, without the consent of the devolved legislatures. The lack of any 
meaningful principle here was exposed by the Miller case.43 Although the Sewel convention, 
to the effect that the UK Parliament will not normally legislate in relation to devolved matters 
without the consent of the devolved legislature affected, had been given statutory recognition 
in the Scotland Act 2016,44 and then in the Wales Act 2017,45 this recognition falls short of 
legal authority.46 Nick Barber argued in 2010 that Parliament was effectively constrained by 
these provisions:  
‘The Scottish Parliament has the power it has because of a statute of the United 
Kingdom Parliament, and, in law, the United Kingdom Parliament retains the capacity 
to remove these powers at any time.  This narrow legal view obscures the constitutional 
reality of the Scottish Parliament’s position.  In a federation both the federal level (for 
our purposes, the Westminster Parliament) and the state level (Scotland) have their own 
area of power, conferred on them by the constitution, that the other level cannot 
encroach upon: all levels of the state are constitutionally limited.  In many respects the 
United Kingdom now looks more like a federal than a unitary state.’47 
 For many, Miller showed this to be untrue. The Supreme Court took the view that the 
Sewel convention, even with statutory recognition, constituted no more than ‘legislative 
recognition’ of a ‘political convention’ which ‘operates as a political restriction on the activity 
of the UK Parliament’.48 The court could not treat the convention as a legal restriction, but nor 
did it even emphasise its status as a constitutional rule moderating behaviour but falling short 
of a law – the normative via media by which conventions are given salience within our 
uncodified constitution.49  
 Parliamentary practice has since borne out the weakness of the principle of devolved 
consent. The European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017, which authorised the 
triggering of Article 50, was passed without the need for legislative consent, and despite 
                                                 
42 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s 128. 
43 R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 
5. 
44 Scotland Act 2016, s 2, introducing new s 28(8) to the Scotland Act 1998. 
45 Wales Act 2017, s 2, introducing new s 107(6) to the Government of Wales Act 2006. 
46 These identical provisions are framed in terms of recognition not legalisation, eg Scotland Act 2016, s 2: ‘But 
it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved 
matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament’, emphasis added,  
47 N Barber, ‘Scottish Independence and the Role of the United Kingdom’ (UKCLA blog, 11 Jan 2012) 
<https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/01/11/nick-barber-scottish-independence-and-the-role-of-the-united-
kingdom/> accessed 16 July 2019. 
48 R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (n 43) [145]. 
49 The majority of the court in Miller (n 43) stated at [151] that the policing of the scope and the manner of 
operation of political convention ‘does not lie within the constitutional remit of the judiciary, which is to protect 
the rule of law.’ This is undoubtedly true, but courts can recognise the existence and salience of conventions: eg 
Attorney-General v Jonathan Cape Ltd and Others [1976] QB 752; Reference Re Resolution to amend the 
Constitution [1981] 1 SCR (Canada) 753. 
11 
general acceptance that the Sewel convention applies to the Bill, the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act was passed without the legislative consent of the Scottish Parliament.  
 These developments clearly call into question whether the UK constitution has in reality 
done anything to correct the autonomy/associative government imbalance. The Supreme 
Court’s refusal to affirm the constitutional significance of the Sewel convention as a principle 
of associative rule within the constitution, and Parliament’s preparedness to legislate in vital 
matters without devolved consent seems, from one perspective, to deny that there is such a 
principle at work within the constitution at all. However, there is also evidence that in other 
ways, and perhaps paradoxically, the Brexit process is demonstrating, and possibly even 
helping to bring about, a deeper and longer term consolidation of the shared rule dimension of 
devolution. Even in the passage of Brexit-related legislation, it is too easy to address only the 
issue of refusal of consent. There are three other issues to consider. One is the efforts made by 
the UK Government to secure that consent; another is the provisions in this legislation that 
anticipate the dimension of shared rule after Brexit; while a third is making and giving effect 
to new international agreements. We address these in the next sub-section of the article. 
B. Brexit and the Reality of Territorial Pluralism  
The passage of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 is instructive. Section 12 of the 
Act amends the main devolution statutes in order to regulate devolved competence in relation 
to retained EU law. When the Bill was published, clause 11, which became s.12, left to the 
discretion of the UK Government, through Orders in Council, the power to determine when 
and how to release areas of legislative competence to the devolved administrations. It was in 
effect a unilateral, albeit apparently temporary, restriction of the self-rule component of 
devolved authority. The context was the need for common frameworks for the UK after Brexit. 
What happened next is instructive and displays the political strength of the devolved 
administrations acting in concert. Due to the political opposition in Cardiff and Edinburgh to 
this provision, it was completely rewritten. The autonomous prerogatives of the devolved 
territories were largely maintained, supplemented with a complex plan to manage in a shared 
way the drafting of common frameworks in relation to returning EU competences. Before 
Orders in Council relating to common frameworks can be made, an elaborate process of 
consultation must be gone through, involving parliamentary accountability, with a focus upon 
the gaining of consent.50 The final form of s.12 satisfied the Welsh Government which 
recommended legislative consent to the Bill. The Scottish Parliament refused consent but this 
bare fact does not reflect the extensive changes to the Bill. 
 Although it is possible under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act for UK ministers 
to make regulations and even common frameworks without consent, as a matter of political 
principle and of pragmatic practice this appears far more difficult.51 As to principle, the EUWA 
contains procedures which aim to arrive at consent in the making of secondary legislation that 
encompasses devolved matters.52 There is an over-ride power but this would be exercisable in 
the face of consent having been sought and explicitly refused. As a matter of pragmatics, Brexit 
does not fundamentally alter devolved competence. As a consequence, without agreement, 
common frameworks would be simply unworkable since the possibility exists of different and 
conflicting laws being passed across the UK, leading to the potentially interminable passage of 
                                                 
50 See new s 30 A of the Scotland Act 1998, inserted by European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s 12(2). 
51 In addition, any such regulations are subject to a sunset provision. European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, s 
12(9). 
52 EUWA ss 12(2), 12(4) and 12(6). 
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contradictory, tit for tat laws (for example, see discussion below of the UK Withdrawal from 
the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill 2018). In other words, if the central 
state does not take seriously the associative dimension of post-Brexit government, the danger 
is that the UK’s constituent territories will exercise their autonomy in a way that will deeply 
frustrate the Brexit project. 
 A further dimension of this new complex environment is legislation that now 
anticipates common frameworks and which is now embedding in law the need for cooperation 
across the UK. As the Institute for Government puts it:  
There is one important area of agreement: all sides recognise that, after Brexit, 
‘frameworks’ or agreements between the four nations will be required in some of the 
policy areas where powers are returning from the EU. One of the key reasons these new 
agreements are necessary is to ensure the functioning of the ‘UK internal market’, by 
avoiding new barriers to doing business across the UK and unfair competition between 
businesses based in different parts of the UK. Frameworks will also be important 
enablers for the UK government as they pursue new international agreements and trade 
deals.53  
This reality prompted the Institute for Government to observe: ‘Brexit will require the UK and 
the devolved nations to co-operate actively in a way that has not always been necessary within 
the EU structures. The four nations should seize this chance to strengthen their relationship.’54 
The complementarity between autonomy and associative rule which we have argued is inherent 
in the federal idea seems to come to life within this new reality: the thickening and deepening 
of the matrix of territorial rule after Brexit. 
 A good example of what is likely to be an entirely new set of relations can be seen in 
the Fisheries Bill which awaits final passage through Parliament. Fisheries are generally a 
devolved matter; indeed there is a specific intergovernmental concordat on fisheries matters.55 
The Bill is designed to replace the UK’s relationship to the Common Fisheries Policy with 
common frameworks or ‘common approaches’56 to the management of fisheries between the 
UK government and the Devolved Administrations through what are known as ‘fisheries policy 
authorities’.57 The aim is to create a new system to coordinate fisheries policies after the UK 
has left the EU. Crucially, the Bill provides that a Joint Fisheries Statement (JFS) ‘may only 
be prepared by the fisheries policy authorities acting jointly.’58 This is a far cry from the initial 
approach taken in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. The Fisheries Bill contains various 
other consultation requirements. It also contains wide secondary law making powers59 to 
                                                 
53 MJ Jack, J Owen, A Paun and J Kellam, ‘Devolution after Brexit: Managing the environment, agriculture and 
fisheries’ (Institute for Government, 9 April 2018) 
<https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/IFGJ6070-Devoution-After-Brexit-
180413-FINAL-WEB.pdf> accessed 16 July 2019, Summary.  
54 ibid. 
55 Concordat on Fisheries Management in the UK 2012 (updated 2016) 
<https://www2.gov.scot/Topics/marine/Sea-Fisheries/context/Concordat/2012concordat> accessed 16 July 2019. 
56 Fisheries Bill (2017-19) [305], ‘Explanatory Notes’, para 1. 
57 ibid cl 2(4). 
58 ibid cl 3(1). 
59 ibid cls 31 and 33. 
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change retained EU law in relation to current CFP competences, but again these can only be 
exercised with the consent of devolved ministers if they cover areas of devolved competence.60  
 This brings out another dimension of Brexit planning, namely that with so many powers 
returning from Brussels, the Brexit-related legislation is replete with delegated powers to 
change retained EU law, not only for the UK government but also for the devolved 
governments. We see this in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act s.11 as well as in other 
bills, including the Fisheries Bill and the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU 
Withdrawal) Bill.61 This legislation, in making provision for the devolved administrations to 
modify retained EU law, gives them the potential to make significant policy choices in a 
number of areas of returning competence. There are attempts to circumscribe this power in the 
legislation but the upshot of Brexit would be a considerable extension of the areas of 
competence of devolved governments as well as delegated law-making powers to adapt these 
competences to domestic law. Already we have seen the Scottish Parliament legislate in 
anticipation of these powers, passing the UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal 
Continuity) (Scotland) Bill 2018. This Bill asserts that the Scottish Government has powers to 
prepare for Brexit analogous to those given to the UK Government by the EUWA. The UK 
Supreme Court found much of the Bill to be beyond the competence of the Scottish Parliament 
and hence unlawful but, importantly, not the principle of its passage.62 This episode highlights 
that with Brexit will come enhanced autonomy for the devolved administrations in very 
important areas of policy, including in areas where the demarcation of competence between 
centre and devolved administrations is far from clear. The ‘Continuity Bill’ exposes both the 
capacity and the will of the Scottish devolved institutions to try to do Brexit ‘their way’: the 
potential headache this could pose to the UK Government in trying to coordinate a unified 
approach to repatriation of competences is very clear. Since there are so many areas of possible 
overlap, these parallel powers can only work through detailed cooperation at official as well as 
political level. Again we see how the imbalance between the autonomy and associative 
government dimensions of devolution is potentially problematic.   
 A third point is that Brexit of course anticipates new international agreements. While 
the UK Government will have relative autonomy in the drafting, agreement and ratification of 
these, it is a very different matter when it comes to implementation should these agreements, 
as in areas such as fisheries or agriculture, involve devolved matters. Other countries with 
multi-level systems of government, such as Canada, have recognised the risk of variable levels 
of implementation, and have in place processes designed to build coordination through 
consensus;63 the UK will surely need such a system. When new agreements concern devolved 
matters such as fisheries there will be extensive discretion on the part of devolved legislatures 
on how best to implement these. And since the Fisheries Bill requires consent in drawing up 
new common frameworks, the devolved territories’ policy positions will have legal as well as 
                                                 
60 ibid cl 35. 
61 ibid cl 37 and schedule 6; Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (2017-19) 
[309] cl 5 and schedule 2.  
62 The UK Withdrawal from the European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill – A Reference by the 
Attorney General and the Advocate General for Scotland (Scotland) [2018] UKSC 64. 
63 F Morrissette, ‘Provincial Involvement in International Treaty Making: The European Union as a Possible 
Model’ (2012) 37 Queen’s Law Journal 577. For discussion, see also House of Lords Constitution Committee, 
Parliamentary scrutiny of treaties (HL 2017–19, 345) (hereafter ‘Parliamentary scrutiny of treaties Report’), para 
135. 
14 
political weight. There are strong signs that the Government is alive to the new political 
realities of heavily over-lapping competences in relation to international treaty-making.64  
 Therefore, in light the most recent Brexit- related legislation, it seems that we should 
perhaps see Miller and the first draft of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill as the start and 
certainly not the end of the Brexit story in relation to devolved authority and the need for deeply 
entwined associative government which it inevitably presages. In fact, the political backlash 
from these two developments seems to have alerted the Government to the need for a more 
federal mentality in relation to consent, particularly in light of the nationalist pressures from 
Scotland. Devolved consent will most likely continue to be refused for Brexit bills by the 
Scottish Parliament65 but this appears to have become as much a point of anti-Brexit principle 
as a fear of encroachment on devolved competence. The legislation now emerging is alive to 
the fact that with such extensive overlap between returning EU competences and devolved 
powers, common frameworks can only be drafted and managed by way of consent. 
Furthermore, the new international agreements in so many of these areas can also only be 
successfully implemented across the UK in a consistent way through consent. 
C. Strengthening Associative Government 
These factors are not however the whole story. There are several areas in which institutions are 
still to catch up with competences and where a union or federal mentality needs to infuse this 
development. We will mention a few of these briefly. One is intergovernmental relations (IGR), 
which operates principally through the Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC), a structure often 
criticised for its lack of formalisation and tendency to be side-lined by the central 
government.66 But interaction between the UK and devolved governments has already been 
widening and deepening in light of the new competences devolved through the Scotland Acts 
2012 and 2016, and the Wales Act 2017. 
 Scotland in particular stands out for the very broad expansion in devolution brought 
about by the Scotland Act 2016.67 These new powers are in many cases shared with the UK 
Government. For example, the Act devolves extensive tax-varying powers (building on those 
already contained in the 2012 Act), and these powers now require close cooperation with the 
Treasury, as do concurrent powers to create new benefits and to roll out Universal Credit. 
Indeed the implementation of new welfare policies and the management of them also require 
                                                 
64 See for example evidence given by David Lidington, Chancellor to the Duchy of Lancaster, to the Constitution 
Committee inquiry into parliamentary scrutiny of treaties: ‘Parliamentary scrutiny of treaties report’ (n 63) paras 
145 and 147. 
65 Recent examples of Bills which have not received the legislative consent of the Scottish Parliament include the 
Trade Bill (2017-19) [364], the Agriculture Bill (2017-19) [266] (as introduced), [292] (as amended), and the 
Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (n 61). 
66 ‘Inter-governmental Relations in the United Kingdom Report’ (n 8) paras 50, 61-2, 70-2, 76 and 86. See this 
report also for a thorough description and analysis of how the system currently operates. 
67 The Constitution Committee summarised the new powers thus: ‘The Scottish Parliament acquires control of its 
own composition and electoral system. The Bill devolves significant tax powers, particularly in relation to the 
rates and bands of income tax, and allocates a significant share of VAT receipts to the Scottish Government. 
Powers in relation to welfare benefits are devolved for the first time… The Scottish Parliament and Government 
acquire new powers in policy areas such as employment, transport, energy efficiency, fuel poverty, and onshore 
oil and gas extraction, and authority in relation to a range of public bodies, hitherto reserved. They will also have 
competence over the Crown Estate, equal opportunities and abortion policy, plus many other public functions; 
while almost all Tribunals will be devolved.’ ‘Scotland Bill Report’ (n 8) para 8. 
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close cooperation between Edinburgh and London. Other examples of associative government 
produced by the 2016 Act are duties of consultation on renewable electricity incentive 
schemes; requirements for consent on electoral registration; the need for information-sharing 
on roads policy and welfare provisions; the sharing of proceeds from onshore petroleum; and 
provisions in relation to management of cross-border bodies on equal opportunities and the 
British Transport Police. The House of Lords Constitution Committee, noted the high degree 
of overlap in powers which the Scotland Act 2016 would bring: ‘the hitherto fairly 
straightforward demarcation between reserved powers and those devolved to the Scottish 
Parliament will become considerably less clear.’68 
 The reality of overlapping powers from the 2016 Act (and analogous developments in 
the Wales Act 2017) are therefore already demanding a far more involved level of executive 
intergovernmental relations than previously existed, at least at the level of officials, even 
though political relations remain tense. We see the emergence of this in civil service training 
and in the far more extensive engagement between the central administration and devolved 
administrations in the everyday management of the state.69 Much of this is below the political 
radar, but it is real. 
 In light of Brexit, further steps will be needed, including adjustment of the terms of 
reference of the JMC. This is required to accommodate three major developments associated 
with withdrawal from the EU: one is the new common frameworks; a second is the new 
regulatory bodies that will be needed to manage these across devolved and reserved areas; and 
a third is the drawing up, ratification and implementation of new international agreements.70 It 
may well be that the JMC will need a new sub-committee or committees to cover these complex 
and voluminous areas of practice.71  
 More generally, a set of firmer, practical commitments to getting the necessary JMC 
business done will be essential, including a firmer timetable for meetings - both bilateral and 
plenary - and a set of plans for drawing up agendas consensually. Some, including the Institute 
for Government, have argued that a set of guiding principles may help create trust, but of more 
pressing significance would seem to be practical plans for more meetings and for the continued 
redirection of civil service resources to get the work done.  
 Another necessary change will be one of mind-set, and the diversion by Whitehall of 
significant resources to the day to day running of the new system, to deal with technical matters, 
and allowing executive level IGR meetings and other interactions to address serious policy 
issues. But again there is evidence that this is happening, as planning for new common 
frameworks in light of the shared powers in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act and other 
Brexit-related bills bring the devolution angle to the fore.  
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 What about overall management? The Bingham Centre has suggested that the UK needs 
to develop a Department for the Union to replace the separate territorial departments, Scotland 
Office, Wales Office etc.72 This may make sense, provided it does not become an antagonist 
in the game and start to exercise a form of hegemony. Canada has an equivalent in the Privy 
Council Office, and it is not always seen as an honest broker by the provinces. One advantage 
of the separate offices is that they help facilitate the bilateral as well as plural inter-
governmental relations which are part of our asymmetrical system. As has been argued, 
associative government can play out in different ways, but it is essential that institutions are 
designed to foster cooperative rather than inimical association. 
 Intergovernmental discussions inevitably focus mainly upon the executive level, but 
associative government should also be fostered within the legislative branch. When we turn to 
this level the focus in federal discussions tends to be upon the existence and role of second 
chambers; indeed, within narrow institutionalist approaches we frequently find insistence that 
a territorialised second chamber is essential to federal government. Again this is a consequence 
of a very detailed institutionalist mind-set. In the UK there has been no serious attempt to 
rework the House of Lords as a second chamber to reflect the idea of the UK as a territorial 
state,73 and in any case the size of England makes most proposals to do so infeasible.74 But it 
is possible for a second chamber, however it is constituted, to take a particular interest in 
territorial politics, and to act, if not as a voice, at least as a watchdog for the constitutional 
rights of the regions as well as for the health of the union as a whole. The number of inquiries 
on devolution undertaken by the Constitution Committee in recent years suggests that such an 
informal role may well be developing.75 It is also notable that Lords’ committees played an 
instrumental hand in helping to guide the Government towards a radical revision of what 
became s.12 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, and that the Constitution Committee’s 
reports take very seriously the implications of any public bills for devolution,76 including 
Brexit-related bills.77  
 Another way to help foster a federal balance is by legislatures across the UK working 
together in scrutinising IGR, and in so doing helping to build the solidarity of associative 
government among elected politicians who find common cause in facing down executive 
power. Brexit offers a unique opportunity for, and arguably demands, such cooperation. In light 
of the volume of Brexit legislation and the number of international agreements that will be 
needed, it is clear that close cooperation by governments in using ss 11 and 12 will be required. 
It is equally imperative that the legislatures find ways to cooperate, perhaps dividing up issues 
to address and sharing reports, or even moving to working together on inquiries, including joint 
evidence sessions. Even if, in political terms, this is difficult to achieve at first there are more 
modest ways to work together, such as the sequencing of reports. This has worked recently in 
relation to the Lords and Commons where Lords committees have reported ahead of Commons 
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debates knowing the Commons is in a better place to control the government.78 The devolved 




When we consider federalism as an idea rather than a particular institutional form, addressing 
it through the register of constitutional theory, what we find is that balance or equilibrium is 
central to achieving federalism’s essential constitutional purpose: the accommodation of 
territorial pluralism. Autonomy and union (or associative government) are often posited as 
antagonistic goals within federal thought,79 but in fact they are essentially complementary. 
Self-government can only be fulfilled if autonomous territories have a say in governing through 
the central organs of the state; and this process of associating in the practice of government 
makes the state more secure by emphasising its relevance to sub-state territories.  
 Another feature of federalism as an essentially constitutional idea is that the way in 
which this balance is reached must be worked out institutionally from state to state. There is 
no institutional suit to be lifted from the shelf of constitutional options which can be called 
‘federalism’. As we look to the number of fraught constitutional situations around the globe in 
recent decades, from South Africa to Bosnia-Herzegovina to Iraq, where federalism has been 
called upon in radically different ways as a constitutional model thought capable of offering 
both the institutional structure and symbolism of union without unity, we see that the very 
concept of federalism as a constitutional idea is broad and open to a wide range of 
governmental instantiations in response to the particularity of territorial pluralism in each 
polity. 
 This reality is surely encouraging for the UK, with its deep asymmetry and the huge 
imbalance in terms of size among its component territories, its uncodified constitution, the 
absence of a territorial legislative chamber and the limited role it accords to judicial review; all 
of which are treated from certain institutionally-focussed perspectives of federalism to be 
pathological failings. It is therefore the case that each state that is characterised by territorial 
pluralism must find its own balance between autonomy and union. And as other states have 
discovered, it is often when the territorial constitution is seemingly most threatened that states 
through necessity find suitable remedies for existing deficiencies.  
 The UK constitution is living through a time of great uncertainty as well as upheaval, 
but what the Brexit process has exposed is that territorially segmented powers in the UK no 
longer operate in silos as they appeared to do during the first fifteen years of devolution. A 
broader claim made in this article is that the relationship between the two dimensions of federal 
rule are better viewed as a matrix, hosting many avenues of over-lapping interaction, rather 
than through the language of separate or divided levels of rule. In a world of ever more 
pervasive government that spans external as well as internal state relationships, the interplay 
between governments within a territorial union become ever more difficult to disentangle. The 
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United Kingdom, far from being an exception to this truth, is an archetypal case in point. We 
see this as powers are set to return from Brussels into an environment of deep 
intergovernmental engagement brought about by the Scotland Act 2016 and Wales Act 2017. 
The management of these powers will require the deep involvement of the devolved 
administrations in both the preparation of new common approaches to shared competence and 
the building of new UK external relations both with and beyond the European Union.80 
 This new matrix of associative government also demands a significant change in 
mentality, to foster institutions of interaction at legislative as well as executive level best suited 
to manage the new reality. If one of the lessons of Brexit is that it is very hard to create a clean 
break in relation to an entity with which you have built up extensive and interwoven patterns 
of government, then the domestic lesson too must be that the process of returning these powers 
to an already territorially-segmented UK will inevitably also lead to deep and extensive 
processes of sharing, cooperation and agreement.  
 Dicey viewed federalism (as did Carl Schmitt four decades later) as a pathology that 
would either disappear in the face of centripetal pressures or lead to the dissolution of those 
states which adopted it. The last century has exposed this to be empirically false as federal 
states have proliferated and constitute many of the most durable and stable democracies in the 
world today. The UK does not bear the name federal, nor does it need to. But it is the case that 
federalism is a useful prism through which to assess if the UK is capable of achieving a 
successful balance between its territorial diversity on the one hand and the efficacy of union 
which is the essential complement of pluralism on the other. We don’t know where the UK’s 
fraught attempts to leave the European Union will lead, but, if nothing else, the political 
realities of the past two years may have begun to move the UK, perhaps grudgingly and 
certainly not smoothly, towards a greater understanding of what it means in practice to live out 
constitutionally the abstract idea of union. 
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